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The economic loss rule: 
Robinson Helicopter v Dana (2004) 
Roger Bernhardt 
 
Economic-loss rule does not bar tort recovery (compensatory and punitive damages) in 
claim for intentional misrepresentation or fraud independent of claim for breach of 
contract. 
Robinson Helicopter Co. v Dana Corp. (2004) 34 C4th 979, 22 CR3d 352 
Robinson Helicopter Co., which manufactures helicopters, purchased sprag clutches from 
Dana Corp. The clutches had to conform to the “type certificate” for the helicopters issued by the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Between July 1996 and October 1997, Dana changed 
the manufacture of the clutches; the newly produced lutches did not conform to the FAA 
certificate requirements. Dana did not notify Robinso  or the FAA of the change, and Dana 
continued to provide written certification that the clutches had been manufactured in conformity 
with the certificate requirements. During the change, the clutches experienced a failure rate of 
almost 10 percent, as compared to an almost zero failure rate before and after. At its own 
expense, Robinson replaced almost 1000 defective clutches.  
Robinson sued Dana for breach of contract, breach of warranty, and negligent and intentional 
misrepresentations. The jury awarded Robinson $1,533,924 in compensatory damages and $6 
million in punitive damages. The jury based its punitive damages award on Dana’s false 
misrepresentations of fact and knowing misrepresentation or concealment of material facts with 
the intent to defraud. The court of appeal reversed th  punitive damage award, holding that, 
based on the economic-loss rule, Robinson could not recover tort damages because it suffered 
only economic losses. 
The California Supreme Court reversed, holding thate economic-loss rule did not apply to 
Robinson’s independent claims for intentional misrepresentation or fraud based on Dana’s 
provision of false certificates of conformance. The court explained that these tort claims existed 
independently of Dana’s breach of contract. The court pined that public policy favored its 
holding, because Robinson advanced the public interest in punishing Dana’s intentional 
misrepresentations and in deterring such misrepresentations in the future. 
The court rejected Dana’s argument that the fraud and misrepresentation claims were simply 
part of the alleged breach of contract, pointing out that a contracting party could not rationally 
calculate the possibility that the other party will deliberately misrepresent critical terms. The 
court stated that public policy did not support theimplied consequence of Dana’s argument: the 
increased uncertainty in contractual relationships that would result from encouraging fraudulent 
conduct at the expense of an innocent party.  
Justice Werdegar dissented, opining that the majority gave new life to the moribund doctrine 
of bad faith breach of contract. 
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: Although an impressive roster of attorneys appeared in this 
case—showing its obvious importance to many economic factors in this state—I couldn’t 
help but note that no real estate interests attemptd to get involved in the matter. Although 
the parties actually involved in the case had nothig to do with real estate, the rule dictating 
the outcome could have a major impact on construction l tigation. (Indeed, the three 
precedents most discussed by the court—Jimenez v Superior Court (2002) 29 C4th 473, 127 
CR2d 614; Aas v Superior Court (2000) 24 C4th 627, 101 CR2d 718; and Erlich v Menezes 
(1999) 21 C4th 543, 87 CR2d 886—all involved building contractors sued for construction 
defects by real estate purchasers.)  
It is not hard to see how the court’s creation of an exception to the economic-loss rule for 
independent fraud could play out in a construction c text. The manufacturer in Robinson 
was guilty not only of selling defective clutches (the contract claim), but also of falsely 
misrepresenting their condition to the buyer (the tort claim); and because that fraud was a 
tort, independent of the contract breach, the buyer was able to recover punitive tort damages 
as well as compensatory contract damages. I find that quite similar to claims made against a 
building contractor who installed defective windows hile at the same time assuring the 
purchaser that they were in very good shape.  
Although the court majority takes pains to emphasize the narrowness of its decision and 
its confidence that trial courts will enforce stric pleading requirements in cases of alleged 
fraud, Justice Werdegar’s fears that plaintiffs’ attorneys will start piggybacking tort claims 
onto all their breach-of-contract claims certainly seems real when realty is involved. In fact, 
attorneys would be derelict in not trying to do so.(Even though I share Justice Werdegar’s 
apprehensions about the potential uncontrollable scope of the rule, that does not put me in 
agreement with her substantive position, which appers to deny any recovery for fraud 
whenever there was only economic loss, i.e. in the normal case. In fact, I wish our statutory 
measure of damages for fraud went the opposite way and covered benefit-of-the-bargain 
damages as well as out-of-pocket loss.) See Bernhardt, On Making and Breaking Contracts, 
27 CEB RPLR 12 (Jan. 2004).  
However, we should not forget that defective construction in homes is now governed by 
SB 800 (CC §§895–945.5), which took effect last year. See Gerrish & Marks, Construction 
Defect Litigation: The Playing Field Has Changed—A Navigational Guide to Senate Bill 
800, 26 CEB RPLR 106 (May 2003). The statute subjects construction defects to special 
treatment, different from other products liability cases. Economic losses, including cost of 
repairs (and lost income when the home was used as a principal place of a business), are 
covered by it. See CC §944. (Miller & Starr opine that the new statutory measure of 
recovery is one “thereby curtailing part of the California Supreme Court decision in Aas v 
Superior Court,” although I do not quite know what they mean by that, since Aas dealt with 
tort, not contract law.)  
And the statutory measure prevails where it applies. Civil Code §896 declares that a 
defendant is “liable for,” and the homeowner’s cause of action is “limited to,” violation of 
the new statutory standards, which gives the statute a kind of universality and exclusivity. 
However, there is an “except as specifically set for h in this title” clause in that section, 
which is repeated in CC §943(a) (as “except as provided in this title”):  
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title 
or for damages recoverable under Section 944 is allowed. In addition to the rights under this 
title, this title does not apply to any action by a cl imant to enforce a contract or express 
contractual provision, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. 
The statute thus contemplates an independent cause of action for fraud, the same as the 
court has allowed in Robinson Helicopter. Indeed, CC §931 adds that nonstatutory causes of 
action, including “fraud-based claims,” should be “administered according to” the SB 800 
scheme, specifically adding that, “As to any fraud-based claim, if the fact that the property 
has been repaired under this chapter is deemed admissible, the trier of fact shall be informed 
that the repair was not voluntarily accepted by the homeowner” (whatever that means). 
Because the new Act does not cover all forms of real est te, we appear to be destined to live 
in uncertainty about how this new economic-loss carve-out will operate for residential real 
estate (under SB 800) and for commercial real estat (under Robinson Helicopter). Will 
some brave construction litigation expert please write an article for us?—Roger Bernhardt 
 
